(Un)Free
A rant about free will and morality
TW! Suicidal ideation. Existential crisis. Drug addiction. Homicide.
Disclaimer:
I have not proofread this post or consulted any sources while writing it. This is no more than a documented train of thought.
I’ve grappled with suicidal thoughts most of my life. When I was seven, I considered jumping off a balcony. When I was ten, I considered provoking a zoo tiger. When I was thirteen, I considered slitting my wrists. When I was sixteen, I considered jumping before a moving train.
Yet I haven’t done it.
I can list many reasons for and only one against.
Yet I haven’t done it.
So far, I’ve chosen not to choose, although that’s a choice in itself.
But my choice is only a choice if I have free will. And I’m not sure I do.
The burden of free will
Free will is the ability to make choices independently of external constraints and internal compulsion.
Jean-Paul Sartre declared that humans are ‘condemned to be free’ and must bear full accountability for our actions. And the overwhelming moral responsibility leaves us ‘forlorn,’ with no one to lean on.
Our choices, though limited, potentially lead to an endless chain of consequences, creating ethical dilemmas. Moral obligations can be conflicting, and the difficulty of fulfilling all ethical duties simultaneously (or at all) can lead to decision paralysis and ethical burnout. Just take a look at your nearest activist.
The philosophy of morality
Deontology and utilitarianism offer differing views on morality. Deontology focuses on the intrinsic morality of actions, suggesting that morality follows categorical imperatives, although it does not explain who or what determines them. However, many other theories, some stemming from religious beliefs, attempt to provide such details.
Utilitarianism opposes deontology, suggesting that the rightness of an action is determined by its contribution to the greatest good for the greatest number. But it does not define ‘good.’ And ‘good’ is not always as straightforward as in the trolley problem.
Both theories highlight the relative nature of ethics. What’s ethical for someone depends on their personal and societal beliefs.
This poses some critical questions: What makes our ethics more righteous than those we perceive as unethical? Can we ethically hold anyone accountable for their actions based on our own sense of morality?
However, this debate is only relevant if we assume we have free will. But many would argue we don’t.
Determinism and compatibilism
Determinism proposes that the universe’s state at any given moment results from its state at a previous moment and that our choices are only illusions.
Compatibilism merges libertarianism and determinism and suggests that even if prior causes determine our actions, we still act ‘freely’ if our actions align with our desires, intentions, and rational deliberations.
But, to discuss free will, we first need to discuss the mind-body duality.
Dualism and materialism
René Descartes, a supporter of dualism, argued that the mind is a non-physical substance distinct from the body, positing that the two, though separate, interact.
In contrast, materialism, heavily supported by neuroscience, posits that mental states are identical to brain states, i.e. that thoughts, emotions and decisions are linked to specific neural processes.
If our understanding of neuroscience accurately represents our mental processes, then human behaviour is shaped and determined by prior brain states and external influences.
Physcology and neuroscience
Cognitive psychology takes ethical accountability a step further by highlighting that cognitive processes can be subject to biases and heuristics, which can lead to systematic errors in decision-making.
Emotional dysregulation can cloud thought processes, leading to cognitive distortions like black-and-white thinking, catastrophising and overgeneralisation.
Additionally, cognitive psychology posits that some processes operate below the level of conscious awareness, indicating that not all decisions we make are made willfully.
Behavioural psychology suggests that external stimuli influence our behaviour. For example, interpersonal relationships, socioeconomic factors, and reinforcements can affect the likelihood of certain behaviours.
Self-harming can be reinforced by temporary relief from emotional pain or increased attention from others.
Furthermore, behavioural psychology suggests that determinism is reciprocal: we influence and are influenced by our environment.
Neurobiology argues that ‘brain chemistry,’ including neurotransmitters and hormones, influences behaviour and decision-making.
Inbalances in neurotransmitters like serotonin and dopamine can result in feelings of emptiness and depression.
Brain structure also affects our thought processes.
Reduced volume of the prefrontal cortex, associated with higher-order cognitive functions, and enlarged amygdala, associated with emotional responses, can result in emotional dysregulation and impulsive behaviours.
Moreover, neurobiology suggests that our ‘brain chemistry’ and structure can be linked to genetic vulnerability as well as neuroplasticity resulting from trauma, for example.
This raises further questions: What determines our genetic predisposition and external stimuli? If we could know the position and state of every particle immediately after the Big Bang – assuming that’s how the universe came to be – could predict the next war, the end of the world, or any other future event?
This questions might be answered by classical physics.
Classical physics
Classical physics implies that the future state of a system can be precisely predicted given complete knowledge of its current state and the forces acting upon it. Think of Newton’s law of motion, universal gravitation and equations of electromagnetism.
Pierre-Simon Laplace used the concept of the ‘Laplace daemon’ to represent an entity that knows the precise location and momentum of every atom in the universe and can predict its future and past states with absolute certainty.
But such a daemon doesn’t exist (as far as we know). Therefore, brunches of science like thermodynamics are fundamentally rooted in statistical mechanics. And although our predictions are probabilistic, atomic interactions are deterministic.
A causal chain leaves no room for randomness or indeterminacy.
However, classical physics doesn’t deal with the behaviour of particles at the atomic and subatomic levels. Quantum mechanics does.
Quantum mechanics
Quantum mechanics presents a similar paradigm. At the submicroscopic scale, systems exhibit both wave-particle duality. These systems can be described by wave functions, which provide probabilities for finding particles in specific states.
In 1961, Eugene Wigner published an article arguing that because of quantum mechanics’ probabilistic nature, the human body can ‘deviate from the laws of physics,’ suggesting a mind separate from the body. He further claimed that consciousness influences the physical world.
However, according to Leslie Ballentine, Eugene later reconsidered his position and dismissed his own argument as a reductio ad absurdum, although he maintained that the chan of reasoning leading to his original conclusion was valid.
The article in question, ‘Remarks on the Mind-Body Question,’ is 14 pages long. But here is an attempt at summarising its main points.
In his article, Eugene stated that quantum mechanics purports to provide probabilistic connections between apperceptions of consciousness and that observing a system causes its wave functions to change deterministically. This means that when something enters our consciousness, it alters the probabilities of future perceptions.
A predominant feature of quantum mechanics is quantum contextuality, whereby measurements of quantum observables depend on which other observables are measured alongside it. This implies that measurements do not merely reveal pre-existing values but are influenced by the context of other measurements.
One interpretation of this feature is the concept of quantum superposition, which states that systems exist in a superposition of several eigenstates, as described by its wave function. However, when we measure these quantum systems, we obtain only one definite outcome.
The Copenhagen interpretation explains this by asserting that measurement causes the wave function to collapse into a single state.
Other interpretations offer different solutions to this paradox.
The many-worlds interpretation suggests that all possible outcomes of quantum measurements are physically realised in separate, parallel ‘worlds.’
The Broglie-Bohm theory posits that particles have definite positions even when unobserved and that these evolve through time guided by its wave function according to a deterministic law even when unobserved.
Objective-collapse models propose that a wave function collapse occurs when a superposed system reaches a certain objective threshold of size or complexity.
The Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory suggests that each constituent of a physical system undergoes spontaneous collapses independently.
For simplicity, I’ll focus on the wave fuction collapse, also called reduction of the state vector.
This interpretation is central to Eugene’s argument that consciousness acts as the ‘measurement’ causing the wave function to collapse. Thus, he contended that Erwin Schrödinger’s equation, which supports a deterministic view, does not apply to conscious beings.
Eugene illustrated his point with a thought experiment known as ‘Wigner’s friend.’
Imagine Wigner’s friend in a lab performing a quantum measurement on a system assumed to be in superposition of two states, |0⟩ and |1⟩. When the friend measures the system, they observe one of these outcomes, collapsing the system into that state.
Outside the lab, Wigner models the scenario with the friend and the system. The state of this combined system is a mix of ‘system is in state 0, friend has measured 0’ and ‘system is in state 1, friend has measured 1.’
When Eugene asks the friend for the result, he assigns the corresponding state to the combined system. Therefore, the superposition collapses only when Eugene learns the outcome.
The paradox is this: For the friend, the result was determined when they made the measurement, collapsing the system’s state. For Eugene, the collapse occurs only when he becomes aware of the result.
So, when does the collapse truly happen – when the friend finishes the measurement or when Eugene learns the result?
According to Eugene’s reductio ad absurdum, if humans possess consciousness, then this consciousness must grant us free will.
Carlo Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics interpretation offers a different solution to the paradox. It proposes that any physical system can serve as an observer, to which other systems may display ‘facts’ about physical variables. Thus, reality becomes relative and individualised for each ‘observer.’
Quantum measurements are not only relative but also inherently non-absolute. According to the uncertainty principle, there are fundamental limits to the accuracy with which certain pairs of properties can be known simultaneously. The more accurately one property is measured, the less accurately the other can be determined.
Several thought experiments challenge prevailing theories rather than proving them. One of the most famous, designed to discredit the Copenhagen interpretation, is Schrödinger’s cat, proposed by Erwin Schrödinger in a discussion with Albert Einstein about the EPR paradox.
In the original formulation, a cat, a flask of poison, and a radioactive source are placed in a sealed box. If an internal radiation monitor detects an atom decaying, the flask is shattered, releasing the poison and killing the cat. The Copenhagen interpretation suggests that until the box is opened and observed, the cat is simultaneously alive and dead. upon observation, the cat is seen as either alive or dead.
The EPR paradox, named after Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, challenges quantum entanglement. They argued that such behaviour violates the local realism view of causality, which states that an object is influenced directly only by its immediate surroundings. Hence, they concluded that quantum mechanics must be incomplete.
Quantum entanglement occurs when a group of particles are generated, interact, or share spatial proximity so that the quantum state of each particle cannot be described independently of the state of the others, even when separated by large distances.
Measurements of properties such as position, momentum, spin and polarisation performed on entangled particles can be show perfect correlations. For example, if two entangled particles are created with a total spin of zero, and one particle is found to have a clockwise spin on a given axis, the spin of the other particle, measured on the same axis, will be anticlockwise.
However, this behaviour appears paradoxical. Any measurement of a particle’s properties results in an apparent and irreversible wave function collapse, changing the original quantum state. With entangled particles, such measurements affect the entire entangled system.
The EPR thought experiment involes two particles in an entangled state. Measuring the position of the first particle allows the prediction of the position of the second particle. Similarly, measuring the momentum of the first particle allows the momentum of the position of the second particle.
Albert, Boris and Nathan argued that no action on the first particle could instantaneously affect the second particle, as this would require information to be transmitted faster than light, violating the theory of relativity.
Albert, Boris and Nathan posited that if the value of a physical quantity could be predicted with a probability equal to unity without disturbing the system, an element of reality corresponding to that quantity must exist.
Therefore, the second particle must have definite values of both position and momentum before either is measured.
Despite this reasoning, quantum mechanics’ counterintuitive predictions have been experimentally validated with photons, electrons, top quarks, molecules, and even small diamonds. These experiments measured the polarisation or spin of entangled particles was measured at locations far enough apart that communications at light speed would take longer than the interval between measurements.
Some interpretations suggest that measurement effects occurs instantaneously, while others deny wave function collapse altogether, disputing any such effect.
However, all interpretations agree that entanglement produces a correlation between measurements and that mutual information between entangled particles can be exploited.
Despite popular belief, quantum entanglement cannot be used for faster-than-light communication.
Although many quantum theories support ‘randomness,’ they do not straightforwardly support free will, but rather unpredictability.
Free will (or lack thereof) and accountability
My rant hasn’t definitively answer the question of free will. Assuming I possess all relevant knowledge and that my arguments are flawless, it seems likely that we do not have ‘free will’ as previously defined.
So, can we ethically hold anyone accountable for their actions?
We might still ‘choose’ to deprive someone of their freedom to protect society. However, deterring and punishing them for their actions might not be ethical. The legal system recognises that certain conditions can impair an individual’s ability to make ‘free choices.’ But according to the arguments I’ve presented, all conditions might ‘impair’ our ability to make ‘free choices.’
We can adopt a compatibilist view, where we act freely if our actions align with our desires, intentions and rational deliberations.
But can we ethically hold anyone accountable for their desires, intentions, and rational liberations?
Neuroscience suggests that genetic and environmental factors, such as predispositions to mental health conditions, upbringing, socioeconomic status, and exposure to trauma, shape and cloud our cognitive processes and decision-making.
Personality disorders, for example, are characterised by enduring maladaptive patterns of behaviour, cognition and inner experience that deviate from cultural norms.
Behavioural psychology indicates that our personalities form early in life and are shaped by genetic and environmental factors. Thus, our ‘choices’ result from what has been ‘given to us.’
Drug addicts often describe their cravings and urge to use substances as overwhelming, unshakable and irresistible despite knowing the negative consequences.
These cravings can dominate their thoughts and actions and can feel uncontrollable. Addicts may go to great lengths to obtain their substance of choice, finding relief or euphoria that reinforces the behaviour, especially as an escape from withdrawal symptoms.
We perceive drug addicts as victims who need and deserve help. Serial killers often describe their feelings similarly. Yet, we condemn them for their actions and often prefer punishment over (re)habilitation.
Ted Bundy confessed to 30 homicides, primarily of women whom he lured into his vehicle or home to rape and murder. He described his urge to kill as a ‘constant pressure’ he couldn’t resist.
Jeffrey Dahmer commited 17 homicides, luring men and boys into his home to drug, rape, strangle and dismember them. He described his need to kill and engage in necrophilia as uncrontrollable.
Dennis Rader, who murdered 10 people and sent taunting letters to the police and media, described his crimes as driven by a ‘monster’ inside him, with compulsions were so powerful he couldn’t resist them despite understanding the consequences.
I’m not advocating for or against freeing serial killers or being more ‘compassionate’ towards them. I’m not even suggesting we should believe what they claim to experience. But I’m opening up the thought that they may never have had a chance to act differently.
This is similar to how ‘normal’ people feel about many things.
Ask a photographer why they chose their career path, and they might say they felt compelled to. Ask an activist why they engage in activism, and they might say they felt compelled to. Ask a ‘newspaper hero’ why they jumped before a moving car to save a child, and they might say they felt compelled to.
It might just be my cluster-B characteristics leading me to abstain from any responsibility and blame the universe for everything I’ve ever (not) done and will (not) do. But I can’t shake the uncanny feeling that I play a meaningless yet inevitable role in the universe and that feeling this way and ranting about free will was purposelessly ‘meant to be’ since the beginning of time.